Research paper on spectre attack
Abstract
Modern processors use branch prediction and specula- tive execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally arrives, the CPU either discards or commits the speculative computation. Speculative logic is unfaithful in how it executes, can access to the victim's memory and registers, and can perform operations with measurable side effects.
Spectre attacks involve inducing a victim to specula- tively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side channel to the adver- sary. This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process. More broadly, the paper shows that speculative execution implementations violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms, including operating sys- tem process separation, static analysis, containerization, just-in-time (JIT) compilation, and countermeasures to cache timing/side-channel attacks. These attacks repre- sent a serious threat to actual systems, since vulnerable speculative execution capabilities are found in micropro- cessors from Intel, AMD, and ARM that are used in bil- lions of devices.
While makeshift processor-specific countermeasures are possible in some cases, sound solutions will require fixes to processor designs as well as updates to instruc- tion set architectures (ISAs) to give hardware architects and software developers a common understanding as to what computation state CPU implementations are (and are not) permitted to leak.
https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf
Modern processors use branch prediction and specula- tive execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally arrives, the CPU either discards or commits the speculative computation. Speculative logic is unfaithful in how it executes, can access to the victim's memory and registers, and can perform operations with measurable side effects.
Spectre attacks involve inducing a victim to specula- tively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side channel to the adver- sary. This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process. More broadly, the paper shows that speculative execution implementations violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms, including operating sys- tem process separation, static analysis, containerization, just-in-time (JIT) compilation, and countermeasures to cache timing/side-channel attacks. These attacks repre- sent a serious threat to actual systems, since vulnerable speculative execution capabilities are found in micropro- cessors from Intel, AMD, and ARM that are used in bil- lions of devices.
While makeshift processor-specific countermeasures are possible in some cases, sound solutions will require fixes to processor designs as well as updates to instruc- tion set architectures (ISAs) to give hardware architects and software developers a common understanding as to what computation state CPU implementations are (and are not) permitted to leak.
https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf